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SPEEDY TRIAL
United States v. Lovasco, 97 S. Ct. 2044 (1977).
The Supreme Court of the United States has
recognized that the right to a speedy trial "is
one of the most basic rights preserved by our
Constitution."' The right, as encompassed by
the sixth amendment to the United States Con-
stitution,2 can be traced to the Magna Carta of
1215,3 which states, "we will sell to no man, we
will not deny or defer to any man either justice
or right. '4 The Framers of the Constitution,
being well versed in the philosophy of the
Magna Carta and its interpretations in the
English law, considered the right fundamental
and included it in the Constitution.'
Until recently however, the Supreme Court
has provided little guidance as to when an
accused may assert this right.6 In United States
I Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 226
(1967). The Supreme Court held that the right to a
speedy trial is a fundamental right and is applicable
to the states via the fourteenth amendment due
process clause. Id. at 222-23.
2 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial." U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.
I See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223
(1967). Evidence that the right pre-dated even the
Magna Carta may be found in Assize of Clarendon
(1166).Id. at 223.
4 Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223
(1967), (quoting Magna Carta ch. 29 (ch. 40 of King
John's Charter of 1215) (1225), translated and quoted
in Coke, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF
THE LAws OF ENGLAND (Brooke ed. 5th ed, 1797)).
5 Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 225
(1967). Evidence that the right was considered fun-
damental is found in the early constitutions of the
states and its prominent place in the sixth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution. Id. at 225-26.
6 In their concurring opinion in Dickey v. Florida,
398 U.S. 30, 40 (1970) (Brennan, Marshall, JJ., con-
curring), Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Mar-
shall criticize the Court's lack of attention with regard
to the right to a speedy trial. Only three Supreme
Court cases before Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386
U.S. 213 (1967), dealt with the right: . Beavers v.
Haubert, 198 U.S. 77 (1905), Pollard v. United States,
352 U.S. 354 (1957), and United States v. Ewell, 383
U.S. 116 (1966). The Court in Beavers dealt with the
right in terms of the relevant circumstances sur-
rounding the particular case. 198 U.S. 77, 86 (1904).
In Pollard, the Court said that the delay cannot be
purposeful, 352 U.S. at 361, and in Ewell, the Court
v. Marion,7 the Supreme Court focused on the
language of the sixth amendment8 and con-
cluded that the sixth amendment speedy trial
provision does not apply until an individual
becomes an accused, that is either through
arrest or indictment. The Court also stated
that Rule 48(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure9 is limited in application to post-
arrest situations, and in a footnote expressed
doubt as to whether the rule applies in circum-
stances where the indictment is the first formal
act in the criminal prosecution. 0
In Marion, the defendants were indicted ap-
proximately three years after their alleged
criminal acts (consumer fraud). The district
court dismissed the indictment stating that the
delay was bound to have seriously prejudiced
discussed the reasons for having the right, 383 U.S.
at 120. After Klopfer and up until the time of Dickey,
which dealt with the right as applicable to an individ-
ual charged with a state offense but already incarcer-
ated on an unrelated federal charge, 398 U.S. at 30,
only one other case, Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374
(1969), dealt with the right. Smith involved the right
as applicable to an individual who is serving time on
a charge imposed by another jurisdiction, 393 U.S.
at 377-78.
In their concurrence in Dickey, Brennan and Mar-
shall note that none of the Court's opinions relating
to the right to a speedy trial adequately discuss the
parameters of the right and leave open such basic
questions as to when the right attaches, whether
prejudice to the accused must be proven, and
whether the delay must be part of a deliberate scheme
by the prosecutor. 398 U.S. 30, 41 (1970) (Brennan,
Marshall, JJ., concurring).
7 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
8 The Marion Court focused on the inclusion of
the word 'accused' in the sixth amendment, see note
2 supra, and concluded that "[tihe framers could
hardly have selected less appropriate language if
they had intended the speedy trial provision to pro-
tect against preaccusation delay." 404 U.S. at 314-15.
9 "If there is unnecessary delay in presenting the
charge to a grand jury or in filing an indictment
against a defendant who has been held to answer in
the district court, or if there is unnecessary delay in
bringing a defendant to trial, the court may dismiss
the indictment, information or complaint." FED. R.
CRIM. P. 48(b).
10 404 U.S. at 312 n.4 .
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the defendants." Nevertheless, no specific
prejudice was claimed or demonstrated.
12
The Supreme Court, on appeal, reversed
the lower court on the grounds that neither
the sixth amendment nor Rule 48(b) was appli-
cable to the defendants' allegation that the
thirty-eight month delay between the commis-
sion of the act charged and the indictment was
in violation of their right to a speedy trial. The
Court, however, in dicta, recognized that in
certain instances a fifth amendment due proc-
ess' 3 claim would be warranted where the delay
"caused substantial prejudice to appellees'
rights to a fair trial and . . . the delay was an
intentional device to gain tactical advantage
over the accused.' 4 However, in this situation
where no actual prejudice was alleged or
claimed, the Court refused to grant relief un-
der the fifth amendment due process clause.' 5
The federal courts have been divided, in
situations pertaining to pre-arrest or pre-indict-
ment delay, in attempting to interpret and
apply the dicta in Marion.16 Two schools of
" The district court reached its determination by
looking at the three year delay and concluding that
the relevant facts needed to initiate proceedings
against the accused were available to the government
three years earlier. Id. at 310.
12 Id.
13 "[N]or be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
14 404 U.S. at 324 (1971).
11 The Court left open the possibility that actual
prejudice might be proven at trial, but since rio
prejudice was alleged or claimed by the defendants,
the Court held that any due process claim would be
"speculative and premature." Id. at 326.
For a case in which the defendant was granted
relief under the due process clause, see Petition of
Pravoo, 17 F.R.D. 183 (D. Md. 1955). The indictment
was dismissed due to the delay caused by the govern-
ment by bringing the case to trial in New York,
when it should have known that the proper place of
venue was Maryland. Id. at 200.
16 For a detailed description of the disunity be-
tween and within each federal district, see United
States v. Alderman, 423 F. Supp. 847, 849-55 (D.
Md. 1976).
The First Circuit has required the two prong
conjunctive test as a determination of a due process
speedy trial claim. See United States v. Churchill, 483
F.2d 268 (1st Cir. 1973), and United States v. Daley,
454 F.2d 505 (1st Cir. 1972). The Second Circuit has
not definitively decided whether a conjunctive or
disjunctive test is appropriate. In United States v.
Finkelstein, 526 F.2d 517, 525-26 (2nd Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 960 (1976), the question had
been deliberately left open. But see United States v.
Mallah, 503 F.2d 971, 989 (2nd Cir. 1974), where the
thought have emerged: one espousing a two
prong conjunctive test, requiring both the ele-
ments of prejudice and the showing of an
intentional tactical device by the Government
in order to warrant dismissal of an indictment,
and the other requiring either prong of the
test.'
7
In United States v. Lovasco,18 the Supreme
Court purports to clarify "the circumstances in
which the Constitution requires that an indict-
ment be dismissed because of delay between
the commission of an offense and the initiation
of prosecution."1 9 The Court, in an opinion
written by Mr. Justice Marshall, held that "to
prosecute a defendant following investigative
delay does not deprive him of due process,
court said that pre-indictment delay may invalidate a
prosecution if the delay was pari of a scheme to
harass the accused. The Third Circuit has also been
split between the disjunctive and the conjunctive
approach. See United States v. United States Gypsum
Company, 383 F. Supp. 462 (W.D. Pa. 1974), which
requires a two prong conjunctive test and United
States v. Clark, 398 F. Supp. 341, 350 (E.D. Pa.
1975), which requires a disjunctive test. In Hamilton
v. Lumpkin, 389 F. Supp. 1069 (E.D. Va. 1975), a
district court of the Fourth Circuit interpreted Marion
as requiring a disjunctive test. Within the Fourth
Circuit, however, there are very few cases construing
the Marion opinion and it remains unclear what the
rule in this circuit is. The Fifth Circuit has recently
shifted from a disjunctive test, United States v.
Schools, 486 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1973), to a conjunctive
test requirement, United States v. Duke, 527 F.2d
386 (5th Cir. 1976). The Sixth, Seventh and Eighth
Circuits have all interpreted Marion as requiring a
two part conjunctive test; United States v. Alred, 513
F. 2d 330 (6th Cir. 1975), United States v. White, 470
F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1972), and United States v. Atkins,
487 F.2d 257 (8th Cir. 1973). The Ninth Circuit has
elected to apply the disjunctive approach, United
States v. Erickson, 472 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1973), while
the Tenth Circuit has gone the other way and re-
quired a conjunctive approach, United States v.
MacClain, 501 F.2d 1006 (10th Cir. 1974).
17 Some courts have rejected both the disjunctive
and conjunctive approach and have attempted to
apply a balancing test. In United States v. Harmon,
379 F. Supp. 1349 (D. NJ. 1974), the court said that
it does not recognize the two prong test to be the
holding in Marion, and instead attempts to balance
all the circumstances involved in the delay to reach a
determination of the defendant's right to a speedy
trial. Id. at 1351. See also United States v. Mays, 549
F. 2d 670 (9th Cir. 1977).
"s 97 S. Ct. 2044 (1977). The opinion was written
by Justice Marshall, joined by Chief Justice Burger,
and Justices Brennan, Stewart, White, Blackmun,
Powell, and Rehnquist, with Justice Stevens, dissent-
ing, id., at 2053.19 Id. at 2046.
[Vol. 68
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
even if his defense might have been somewhat
prejudiced by the lapse of time.
20
In Lovasco, the respondent was indicted on
March 6, 1975, on three counts of unlawful
possession of handguns stolen from the United
States mail. 21 The indictments, handed down
some seventeen months after the alleged of-
fense, referred to eight guns which Lovasco
possessed and sold to a third party between
July 25, 1973 and August 31, 1973. The district
court and the court of appeals22 dismissed the
indictments because the delay was "unnecessary
and unreasonable" and resulted in the defend-
ant being prejudiced in that two allegedly ma-
terial witnesses had since died. It was con-
tended that one witness, Tom Stewart, would
have testified that he sold Lovasco two of the
firearms in question, adding substance to Lo-
vasco's claim that he did not know the firearms
were in fact stolen from the United States
mails.23 The second witness, respondent's
brother, was allegedly a witness to the transac-
tion between Stewart and Lovasco and all of
Lovasco's sales.
The district court also found that the postal
inspector in charge of the case would have
recommended that proceedings against Lo-
vasco be initiated as early as October 2, 1973,
based on findings contained in a report submit-
ted to the United States Attorney.2 The prose-
curing attorney, however, attempted to justify
the delay by claiming that the initiation of
proceedings against Lovasco were delayed in
the hope of identifying and proving ,the in-
volvement of others in the offense, particularly
the accused's son. The district court and the
court of appeals, nevertheless, deemed the
delay unjustified, unnecessary and unreasona-
ble.
20 Id. at 2052.
21 Lovasco was actually indicted on four counts;
the fourth count pertaining to the business of dealing
in firearms without a license. Since this count is
irrelevant to the question of whether the guns were
stolen, the lower courts have treated it as distinct
from the other three counts. 532 F.2d at 62 (8th Cir.
1976).
22 532 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1976).
23Id. at 61. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
stated that Lovasco failed to show how the witnesses
would have aided in his defense had they been
willing or able to testify. 97 S. Ct. 2047 (1977). Judge
Henley's dissent to the court of appeals' opinion,
brings out the same question. 532 F.2d 59, 62 (8th
Cir. 1976).
24 532 F.2d 59, 61 (8th Cir. 1976).
In reversing the appellate court, the Su-
preme Court held that although prejudice is a
necessary element of a due process claim, it
alone is not sufficient, so that a "due process
inquiry must consider the reasons for the delay
as well as the prejudice to the accused."5 The
Court based its reasoning for the holding on
United States v. Marion, concluding that the
Marion Court formulated a two prong conjunc-
tive test in determining the validity of a due
process claim.
The two part formulation, as espoused in
Marion, (1) prejudice and (2) intentional delay
to gain a tactical advantage, has been somewhat
reformulated by the Court in Lovasco. While
retaining the first part of the test, prejudice,
the Court has altered the second part into an
inquiry regarding the reasons for the delay.
26
While the significance of the reformulation is
open to debate and will be explored in detail
later on in the case note, it is interesting to
note that both the Marion and Lovasco formula-
tion represent a departure from the earlier
Supreme Court case, Pollard v. United States.
27
In Pollard, the Court held that the "delay must
not be purposeful or oppressive,"' and denied
petitioner's claimed violation of a speedy trial
based on a two year delay in sentencing after
his trial. The Court in Pollard based its decision
on the fact that the delay was accidental and
promptly remedied when discovered. Under
the Marion or Lovasco formulation, however, it,
would appear that purposeful delay by the
Government would be perfectly acceptable un-
25 97 S. Ct. at 2049.
26 In the concurring opinion in Dickey v. Florida,
398 U.S. 30, 40 (1970) (Brennan, Marshall, JJ., con-
curring), Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Mar-
shall provide a possible insight as to why the major-
ity's opinion in Lovasco, which was written by Mar-
shall, fails to reiterate the precise language of Marion.
In Dickey, Marshall and Brennan recognize delay in
prosecution brought around through the negligence
of the government as relevant to a speedy trial claim,
398 U.S. at 51-52. Reiteration of the language in
Marion could have the effect of precluding a speedy
trial claim based upon negligence.
27 352 U.S. 354 (1957).
2Id. at 361. See Note,The Lagging Right to a Speedy
Trial, 51 VA. L. REv. 1587 (1965). "If 'purposeful'
means bordering on bad faith, then no court delay is
ever likely to run afoul of the sixth amendment. On
the other hand, if 'purposeful' means intentional, it
makes very little sense to draw a constitutional line
between accidental delays and intentional good faith
delays." Id. at 1600.
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less it was to gain a tactical advantage over the
defendant. Thus the Court has apparently
shifted its approach and is willing to sanction
intentional delay in certain instances in prose-
cuting a defendant.
Marshall's opinion in Lovasco has also ce-
mented the notion that the sixth amendment
speedy trial provision is not applicable to the
pre-arrest, pre-indictment stage. In Marion,
Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall con-
curred, but took issue with the majority and
indicated that the sixth amendment was appli-
cable to the pre-indictment stage.2 9 Yet in Lo-
vasco, Marshall was willing to accept the notion
that the sixth amendment is not applicable
prior to arrest or indictment. One possible
explanation for this shift in opinion is that the
concurring Justices in Marion now believe that
the fifth amendment due process clause can
protect the rights of the potential defendant as
well as the sixth amendment speedy trial pro-
vision.
The Supreme Court, in interpreting the due
process formulation espoused in Marion as re-
quiring a two prong conjunctive test, will ap-
parently eliminate some of the confusion in
the federal courts surrounding a due process
speedy trial claim. 30 The Lovasco Court based
its support of the two prong formulation on
three reasons. First, the Court expressed con-
cern that "compelling a prosecutor to file public
charges as soon as the requisite proof has been
developed . . .would impair the prosecutor's
ability to continue his investigation, thereby
preventing society from bringing lawbreakers
to justice. ' ' 31 Secondly, the Court has expressed
its reluctance to force prosecutors into initiating
proceedings in doubtful cases, and finally the
Court is unwilling to interfere with the subjec-
tive analysis of the prosecutor in whether to
29 404 U.S. at 328 (Douglas, Brennan, Marshall,
JJ., concurring). Justices Marshall, Brennan and
Douglas refute the majority opinion's interpretation
of English and colonial American history that the
sixth amendment's speedy trial provision was never
intended to apply to the pre-indictment stage. "The
English common law, with which the Framers were
familiar, conceived of a criminal prosecution as being
commenced prior to indictment. Thus in that setting
the individual charged as the defendant in a criminal
proceeding could and would be an "accused" prior
to formal indictment." Id. at 329.
10 See note 16, supra.
31 97 S. Ct. at 2050.
bring charges, notwithstanding the strength of
the Government's case. 2
These three reasons in support of the two
prong conjunctive formulation demonstrate
the Court's unwillingness to force a prosecutor
into initiating proceedings in order to avoid
dismissal due to prejudice to the potential de-
fendant. In Hoffa v. United States,33 which the
Lovasco Court cited to support this notion, the
Court said:
[T]here is no constitutional right to be arrested.
The police are not required to guess at their
peril the precise moment at which they have
probable cause to arrest a suspect, risking a
violation of the Fourth Amendment if they act
too soon and a violation of the Sixth Amend-
ment if they wait too long.34
In addition, this line of reasoning, as ex-
pressed in Hoffa and reflected in Lovasco, dem-
onstrates the Court's concern with the protec-
tion of societal interests. It fails, however, to
take into consideration the protection of the
individual's interests.
In support of its first reason, the protection
of society by not cutting short an investigation
into criminal activities by forcing a prosecutor
to initiate proceedings against a potential de-
fendant, the Court relies on Rochin v. Califor-
nia.3 In Rochin, the Supreme Court, in exam-
ining the due process clause stated that:
The vague contours of the Due Process Clause
do not leave judges at large. We may not draw
on our merely personal and private notions and
disregard the limits that bind judges in their
judicial function. Even though the concept of
due process of law is not final and fixed, these
limits are derived from considerations that are
fused in the whole nature of our judicial proc-
ess. 36
Lovasco, relying on this statement, stands for
the proposition that under a due process claim,
the Court will not second-guess the judgment
of the prosecutor in terms of the time when
32 Id. at 2050-51.
- 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
34 Id. at 310.
- 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
36 Id. at 170-71. See also Lisenba v. California, 314
U.S. 219 (1941); Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312
(1926); and Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112-




prosecution is initiated. The Court, in essence,
has placed all its faith in the ethical conduct of
the prosecutor,37 which of course is open to
serious abuse.38
The second reason the Court gives for its
decision in Lovasco is its reluctance to force
prosecutors into initiating proceedings in
doubtful cases. This reason fails to take into
account the interests of the individual. Those
interests were taken into account, however, in
United States v. Ewell,3 9 where the Supreme
Court, in discussing the speedy trial provision
of the sixth amendment, said that "[tihis guar-
antee is an important safeguard . . . to mini-
mize anxiety and concern accompanying public
accusation and to limit the possibilities that
long delay will impair the ability of an accused
to defend himself."40 While the Ewell Court
was dealing with a post-arrest situation, it is
nevertheless important to focus on its concern
for minimization of anxiety. Long delays dur-
ing an investigative period would clearly serve
to maximize the anxiety of a potential defend-
ant rather than minimize it. Granted, many
times an individual is not even aware that he is
the focus of an investigation, 41 but in those
instances where he is, prolonged delay until
the prosecutor makes up his mind whether or
not to initiate proceedings would have the
effect of maximizing anxiety, and have the
potential for continuous harassment of the in-
dividual.
42
37 For an inquiry into the ethical considerations of
the public prosecutor, see ABA CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7-13 (1976).
-' Mr. Justice Stevens, in his dissent to Lovasco
discussed the seriousness involved in removing all
restraints on the prosecutor's power. 97 S. Ct. at
2053 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
39 383 U.S. 116 (1968).40 Id. at 120.
4' For the view that another sixth amendment
right, the right to counsel, attaches when the individ-
ual becomes the focus of an investigation, see Esco-
bedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1954).
42 For the view that anxiety is generally unimpor-
tant in speedy trial determinations, see Note, The
Right to a Speedy Trial, 20 STAN. L. REv. 476, 481
(1966).
See also United States v. Fay, 313 F.2d 620 (2nd
Cir. 1963), where the court stated that the "general
allegations regarding [defendant's] inability to main-
tain gainful employment or regarding his mental
anguish or that of his family [do not] present the
type of prejudice contemplated by the fourteenth
amendment. It is not the purpose of the due process
clause to defend an accused against public opprob-
The second factor which the Ewell Court
concerns itself with, the ability of an accused to
defend himself, is clearly applicable in a situa-
tion where the prosecutor is hedging about
whether or not to initiate proceedings against
the accused. Delay in initiating proceedings
carries with it the potential that the accused's
ability to defend himself will be impaired,
which is in direct contrast to the goals of a
speedy trial as set forth in Ewell.
The third reason the Lovasco Court sets forth,
the subjective analysis of the prosecutor regard-
ing whether to bring charges, involves human-
itarian concerns and societal interests. This
reason is totally one-sided, putting the interests
of society above thatof the accused, and ignor-
ing the protection of the individual's rights.
Though Lovasco appears to have settled the
issue of whether a due process claim for delay
in prosecution requires a two prong conjunctive
or disjunctive test, the Court has provided little
or no guidance as to what constitutes a valid
claim under either the prejudice or reasons for
the delay phase of the test:
In Marion we conceded that we could not deter-
mine in the abstract the circumstances in which
preaccusation delay would require dismissing
prosecutions. More than five years later, that
statement remains true. Indeed, in the interven-
ing years so few defendants have established
that they were prejudiced by delay that neither
the Court nor any lower court has had a sus-
tained opportunity to consider the constitutional
significance of various reasons for delay. We
therefore leave to the lower courts, in the first
instance, the task of applying the settled princi-
ples of due process.
43
Regarding the prejudice aspect of the test,
the lower courts, in attempting to reach some
sort of formulation or guideline, have been
divided. In the 1972 decision of United States v.
Dukow,44 the Third Circuit held first of all, that
the defendants must demonstrate substantial
prejudice to have their indictment dismissed,
and secondly, that their claim cannot merely
rest upon the passage of time and the dimming
rium." Id. at 624.
43 97 S. Ct. at 2052.
"453 F.2d 1328 (3rd Cir. 1972). Even though there
was a 55 month delay between the time the SEC
initiated proceedings against the defendants and the
indictment, the court held that the defendants failed
to demonstrate substantial prejudice. Id. at 1330.
1977]
SPEEDY TRIAL
of memories. In United States v. Chin,45 how-
ever, the Second Circuit said that one may
assume prejudice to a defendant arising from
the delay in bringing the case to trial.
In their concurring opinion in Dickey v. Flor-
ida,46 Justices Brennan and Marshall discussed
the role of prejudice in speedy trial determina-
tions:
[C]oncrete evidence of prejudice is often not at
hand. Even if it is possible to show that witnesses
and documents once present are now unavaila-
ble, proving their materiality is more difficult.
And it borders on the impossible to measure
the cost of delay in terms of the dimmed mem-
ories of the parties and available witnesses.
Because concrete evidence that their denial
caused the defendant substantial prejudice is
often unavailable, prejudice must be assumed
or constitutional rights will be denied without
remedy.4
In Dickey, the accused, convicted of armed
robbery in 1968 seven years after an arrest
warrant had been issued against him, appealed
on the grounds that the delay had been so
prejudicial as to make a fair trial impossible.
During the seven year period, Dickey had been
imprisoned on an unrelated federal offense
and had repeatedly requested that the Florida
state courts secure his return for a trial or
withdraw the detainer for failure to provide
him with a speedy trial. Reversing Dickey's
conviction, the Supreme Court held that there
was no reason for the delay in light of Dickey's
efforts to secure his right to a speedy trial, and
that there was substantial prejudice in that two
witnesses had died, another had become una-
vailable, and police records of possible rele-
vance had been lost or destroyed.
48
45 306 F. Supp. 397 (S.D. N.Y. 1969). Where the
defendant was indicted for -income tax evasion on
April 10, 1962 for offenses occurring between 1955
and 1956, and was not tried until 1969, the court said
that one may assume prejudice from the delay. But
see United States v. DeLeo, 422 F.2d 487 (1st Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1037 (1970), where the
court was "not persuaded that a presumption of
prejudice arising from the mere passage of time is
either the prevailing doctrine or the most effective
way fully to assure the Sixth Amendment's speedy
trial." Id. at 494.
46 398 U.S. 30 (1970).4
1 Id. at 53-55.
4 1 Id. at 36.
While the majority opinion of Dickey held
that actual prejudice to the accused resulted
from the delay, there is nothing in the opinion
to show how the death of two potential wit-
nesses, the unavailablility of another, and the
loss of police records actually prejudiced the
defendants. What the majority appears to be
doing is establishing that prejudice must be
assumed due to the inherent difficulty in prov-
ing it. Thus, the mere allegation that two
potential witnesses had since died really does
not prove prejudice, since there remains the
question of whether the testimony of the de-
ceased witnesses would have exculpated the
defendant. 49 Furthermore, in proving loss or
lapse of memory, the accused is faced with
even a greater paradox, since any attempt to
show the materiality of certain evidence alleged
to have been forgotten, clearly would prove
that the evidence was not forgotten, and hence
the defendant would be in essence disproving
his point in order to prove it.50
This discussion illustrates that the test for
prejudice has never really been defined by the
Court. ReadingLovasco to its logical conclusion,
however, warrants the determination that in
contrast to Dickey, the Court will never assume
prejudice due to a prolonged investigative pe-
riod. Lovasco's insistence upon a two prong
conjunctive test breaks down if the Court as-
sumes that element of the test. If prejudice
was assumed, all that would be necessary to
dismiss an indictment would be a consideration
of the reasons for the delay. It would seem
illogical for the Court to assume the first part
of the two part formulation when it has ruled
that the formulation is conjunctive in nature.
49 See, e.g., Judge Henley's dissent in United States
v. Barket, 530 F.2d 189 (8th Cir. 1976), where the
death of six witnesses and a 47 month delay in
initiating prosecution was not enough, according to
Henley, to demonstrate prejudice. This view was
reiterated in United States v. Lovasco, 532 F.2d 59,
62 (8th Cir. 1976), where Henley again questioned
the finding of prejudice. See note 23 supra.
-o For a discussion of five factors to be considered
in determining whether or not a pre-arrest delay has
prejudiced an accused's defense, see Note, Pre Arrest
Delay: Evolving Due Process Standards, 43 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 722 (1968). The factors discussed are: (1) ability
of the defendant to re-collect, (2) the level of educa-
tion of the defendant, (3) notice to the defendant
that he is under investigation, (4) failure to locate
witnesses and their potential loss of memory and (5)
length of the delay. Id. at 734.
(Vol. 68
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Relying on the above reasoning, it appears
that Mr. Justice Marshall has shifted from his
opinion in Dickey, where he admitted that prej-
udice to a potential defendant is almost impos-
sible to prove and must be assumed, so as now
to require a potential defendant to prove that
he was prejudiced by the delay."1 Marshall even
points out that so few individuals have success-
fully alleged prejudice that the Court has not
had a sustained opportunity to examine the
other half of the test, reasons for the delay.
Thus on one hand, while acknowledging the
enormous difficulties an individual who has
not been either arrested or indicted has in
proving prejudice due to a prolonged investi-
gative period, the Court still requires proof of
prejudice to overcome the first hurdle in the
two prong test.
Another interpretation of Mr. Justice Mar-
shall's apparent shift of opinion could be that
in certain instances prejudice can be assumed
depending on the length of the delay and the
nrticilar offense aind in orher instances Jt
must be proven. This interpretation gains sup-
port from Beavers v. Haubert,s2 where the Su-
preme Court of the United States held that
"[t]he right to a speedy trial is necessarily rela-
tive. It is consistent with delays and depends
upon circumstances. ' s3 In Beavers, the appel-
lant was indicted in New York and Washington
D.C. and claimed his right to a speedy trial was
violated when the prosecution removed the
proceedings from New York to the District of
Columbia. The Supreme Court, in affirming
the dismissal of the claim, held that the speedy
trial right would not give the defendant the
option to claim it for one offense in order to
prevent arrest for other offenses .54
If, as Marshall seems to contend, prejudice
is to be assumed in certain instances and not in
others, then clearly the latter would warrant
51 The facts relating to the allegation of prejudice
in Dickey and Lovasco are almost identical. The de-
fendants, in both cases, have alleged that because of
the delay, material witnesses had become unavailable,
either through death or other reasons. While in
Dickey the prejudice stemming from the deceased
witnesses is assumed or has been considered to be
proven by the majority, 398 U.S. at 38, the Supreme
Court in Lovasco has not given a definitive answer
regarding prejudice, but questions the materiality of
the witnesses. 97 S. Ct. at 2098-99.
52 198 U.S. 77 (1905).
1 Id. at87.
5 Id.
the application of the two prong test. But this
predetermination of whether the two part for-
mulation should be used appears to defeat the
purpose of the test for it demonstrates the
inherent difficulties of the test's consistent ap-
plication.
This approach also, in light of the lack of
legislative enactment on the question, would
appear to leave the question of prejudice to
the discretion ofjudges without any guidelines
to satisfy the nonarbitrary approach of a due
process claim required under Rochin.n
One possible guideline for the maximum
amount of time the government may delay
prosecution without prejudice can be the stat-
ute of limitations.56 The Supreme Court, in
Toussie v. United States,57 defined the purpose
of a statute of limitations as:
[To limit exposure to criminal prosecution to a
certain fixed period of time following the occur-
rence of those acts the legislature has decided
to punish by criminal sanctions. Such a limita-
tion is designed to protect individuals from
having to defend themselves against charges
when the basic facts may have become obscured
by the passage of time and to minimize the
danger of official punishment because of acts in
the far-distant past. Such a time limit may also
have the salutory effect of encouraging law
enforcement officials promptly to investigate
suspected criminal activity."
In United States v. Ewell,59 the Court also noted
that "the applicable statute of limitations ...
is usually considered the primary guaran-
tee against bringing overly stale criminal
charges ."60
Although there were hints that the courts
would use the statute of limitations as their
guide in fifth amendment speedy trial deter-
minations, this issue was put to rest in Marion,
which recognized the statute of limitations as
an upper boundary, but also acknowledged
5 See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
56 "Except as otherwise expressly provided by law,
no person shall be prosecuted, tried or punished for
any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is
found or the information is instituted within five
years next after such offense shall have been commit-
ted." 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1954) (Offenses; not Capital).
57 397 U.S. 112 (1970).
5Id. at 114.
59 383 U.S. 116 (1966).
60 Id. at 122.
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that prejudice can result if the delay was within
the applicable statute of limitation.61
In their concurring opinion in Dickey,62
Brennan and Marshall also point out that the
statute of limitations is subject to change at the
whim of the legislature, that all crimes do not
have applicable statute of limitations, and that
the applicable statutes may not supply an indi-
vidual his minimum rights to a speedy trial as
guaranteed by the Constitution.
An examination of the second part of the
two prong formulation, the inquiry into the
reasons for the delay, reveals that the Court
has given little or no guidance as to what
constitutes an effective claim. The Lovasco
Court, in looking to the reasons for the delay,
has apparently incorporated the dicta in Mar-
ion; one must consider whether "the delay was
an intentional device to gain tactical advantage
over the accused."6 3 Whether Lovasco has ex-
panded upon the Marion formulation, how-
ever, is not clear, and is open to serious debate.
In a footnote to the majority opinion, the
Court in Lovasco makes reference to the brief
filed on behalf of the government, which con-
cedes that "[a] due process violation might also
be made out upon a showing of prosecutorial
delay incurred in reckless disregard of circum-
stances, known to the prosecution, suggesting
that there existed an appreciable risk that delay
would impair the ability to mount an effective
defense." 64 While the Court did not have to
decide a recklessness issue in Lovasco, it can be
inferred from the inclusion of this language in
the majority's opinion that the Court might be
willing to entertain a broader concept of the
second part of the test than that which was
formulated in Marion.
To understand whether the reformulation
in Lovasco of the second prong of the test
expanded the dicta in Marion, it is essential to
focus on the language in Marion. It is apparent
that the Court has given little or no guidance
as to what it means when it speaks in terms of
intentional delay. In United States v. Frumento,65
the court said that "[m]ere conscious knowledge
of the delay on the part of the government is
61 404 U.S. at 324.
1 398 U.S. at 47 (Brennan, Marshall, JJ., concur-
ring).
404 U.S. 324 (1971).
64 97 S. Ct. at 2051-52 n.17.
405 F. Supp. 23 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
not enough to satisfy the requirement of bad
faith and purposeful delay in the pre-indict-
ment, pre-arrest period."'66 This line of reason-
ing appears to follow Marion in that something
more than knowledge is necessary in order for
the defendant to show an intentional delay by
the prosecution. Nevertheless, the question
arises as to whether the language of Marion
precludes a fifth amendment claim for delay in
prosecution brought about by the negligence
of the government.
A footnote to the majority's opinion in Lo-
vasco67 sheds some light on this matter, in that
it can be inferred that the Court will entertain
a claim based upon recklessness. However, the
footnote is unclear as to ordinary negligence.
In their concurring opinion in Dickey v. Flor-
ida,6 Brennan and Marshall discuss delay in
prosecution brought about by the negligence
of the government:
A negligent failure by the government to ensure
speedy trial is virtually as damaging to the inter-
ests protected by that right as an intentional
failure; when negligence is the cause, the only
interest necessarily unaffected is our common
concern to prevent deliberate misuse of the
criminal process by public officials.
Based on this concurring opinion, it would
appear that Marshall (and Brennan) would
entertain a fifth amendment due process claim
based upon negligence.
Nevertheless, Marshall in Lovasco purports
to follow the Court in Marion, and whether
this represents a departure from the intentional
test of Marion is at best still unclear. It can also
be argued that this represents a signal from
the Court, that the formulation of the second
aspect of the test is still evolving, perhaps to
more accurately reflect the totality of the cir-
cumstances underlying the delay.
Part of the confusion about what the precise
test is can be demonstrated by United States v.
Shaw," a post-Lovasco case in which the Fifth
Circuit broadly interpreted the language in
Lovasco in focusing on "whether the prosecu-
tion's actions violated 'fundamental conceptions
6 Id. at 28.
67 97 S. Ct. at 2051-52 n.17 .
68 398 U.S. 39, 51-52 (Brennan, Marshall, JJ.,
concurring).
69 555 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1977).
[Vol. 68SPEEDY TRIAL
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
of justice' or the 'community's sense of fair
play and decency. ' ' 70 In Shaw, the defendant
was indicted twenty-eight months after his al-
leged offense of defrauding the telephone
company of money due for long distance calls.
The prosecution attempted to explain the delay
on the basis of the need to verify incriminating
evidence and the low priority of the case with
regard to the allocation of prosecutorial re-
sources. The court, notwithstanding the claim
of prejudice by the defendant, affirmed the
conviction because the delay was "not such a
deviation from elementary standards of fair
play and decency or so inimical to our funda-
mental conceptions of justice as to deprive
defendant of due process of law in violation of
the Fifth Amendment."
71
The language of Lovasco which Shaw relies
on to reach its decision refers to the Lovasco
Court's notion that a prosecutor would not be
deviating from "fair play and decency" by de-
laying an indictment until he is confident of
establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The language Shaw relies on is not the test
espoused in Lovasco, but instead appears to be
an amorphous arbitrary concept that can be
used to justify any delay. The difficulty which
the Shaw Court has apparently encountered in
interpreting Lovasco and the relevant law in
terms of pre-arrest, pre-indictment delay, is
representative of the confusion and the lack of
guidance the courts have in these situations.
In addition to the Supreme Court's lack of
guidance regarding the application of the "rea-
sons for delay" aspect of the test, the Court has
yet to determine conclusively who has the bur-
den of proof regarding this issue. The practi-
calities of the situation, as shown by Lovasco,
may render the burden of proof issue moot,
however. In Lovasco, the district court found
that the majority of the information concerning
the crime was gathered during the first month
of the delay and very little during the next
seventeen months.7 2 The Supreme Court, nev-
ertheless, sanctioned the delay on the basis that
the Government was awaiting results of addi-
tional investigations. 3 Thus, for the potential
defendant to establish that the delay was part
of a tactical ploy on the part of the Government
70 Id. at 1299.
71 Id.
72 97 S. Ct. at 2047.73 Id. at 2051-52.
is almost an impossible task.7 4 Any allegations
as such can be countered by the prosecution
claiming that the delay was necessary to further
the investigation against other potential wrong-
doers. Since prosecutorial records, which may
or may not be discoverable may not reflect the
intention of the prosecutor in delaying pro-
ceedings against the accused, the defendant is
left at the mercy of the ethical conduct of the
prosecution in determining whether there was
a legitimate justification for the delay.
Mr. Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion
in Lovasco,7 5 clearly demonstrates the potential
for abuse in such a situation. Even though the
lower courts found no justification for the delay
in handing down the indictment, in Lovasco,
the Court, in a very unusual display of review-
ing the findings of fact, reversed, stating that
the delay was caused by efforts of the prosecu-
tion to identify others involved in the offense.
7 6
By doing so', Stevens points out, the Court has
in essence removed the "constraints on the
prosecutor's power to postpone the filing of
formal charges to suit his own convenience.
77
The Lovasco opinion can also be criticized
because in examining the practicality of the
two prong formulation in determining whether
pre-indictment or pre-arrest delay should war-
rant dismissal of an indictment, the question
arises as to whether the two phases of the test
are distinct enough, so as to be treated as
separate entities. Under the Marion formula-
tion, it is very difficult to imagine a situation in
which an accused can successfully demonstrate
that the delay was caused by the Government
in order to gain a tactical advantage, and yet
fail to prove prejudice. By the very nature of
the proof necessary to demonstrate the former,
the latter would be proven. Nevertheless, the
converse of this, as illustrated by Lovasco, is not
true. Thus, a defendant, by establishing preju-
dice, will not prove the proposition that the
Government engaged in the delay for tactical
purposes. Expanding this reasoning to its logi-
cal conclusion would warrant the determination
74 Moreover, for the view that forcing a prosecutor
to turn over records to the accused will have a
chilling effect as to what evidence is ultimately re-
corded on paper, see United States v. United States
Gypsum Company, 383 F. Supp. 462 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
75 97 S. Ct. 2053 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
76 97 S. Ct. at 2051. See Berenyi v. Immigration
Director, 385 U.S. 630, 635 (1967).
77 97 S. Ct at 2054 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
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that the two prong conjunctive test is unneces-
sary and that only the tactics the Government
engaged in should be considered.
Nevertheless, if one interprets Lovasco as
extending the Marion formulation by examin-
ing the reasons for the delay, then the argu-
ment can be presented that the two prong test
is necessary. Under such an approach, consid-
erations which have little or no bearing on
prejudice may be determinative of a valid claim
under the second part of the test.
It is also interesting to note that prejudice
and reasons for the delay, the two aspects of a
fifth amendment due process claim, represent
two of the four requirements the Court has set
forth in examining a sixth amendment claim.
In Barker v. Wingo,7 8 the Court was presented
with a sixth amendment speedy trial claim
based upon a five year delay between arrest
and trial. In determination of the claim, the
Court identified four factors which should be
assessed in determining whether a defendant
has a valid sixth amendment claim. These fac-
tors are: (1) length of delay, (2) the reasons for
the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of the
right and (4) prejudice to the defendant."
Contrasting the Barker formulation with the
two prong test of Marion and Lovasco, it appears
that the courts will give the sixth amendment
test a more liberal construction since they can
take into account more factors and considera-
tions than under the fifth amendment due
process test. For example, the Barker Court
mentions delay caused by the negligent action
of the prosecutor under the second factor.(' It
is still debatable though, whether negligence
would have any relevance under the fifth
amendment test." The Court in Barker also
states that:
We regard none of the four factors identified
above as either a necessary or sufficient condi-
tion to the finding of a deprivation of the right
of speedy trial. Rather they are related factors
and must be considered together with such
other circumstances as may be relevant. In sum,
these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts
must still engage in a difficult and sensitive
balancing process. But, because we are dealing
with a fundamental right of the accused, this
process must be carried out with full recognition
78 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
7Id. at 530.
80 Id. at 531.
s1 See notes 64 & 68,supra, and accompanying text.
that the accused's interest in a speedy trial is
specifically affirmed in the Constitution.
8 2
Hence, rather than requiring a conjunctive test
such as in Marion and Lovasco, the Barker Court
has taken the approach of encompassing the
totality of circumstances in its determination.
Whether such an approach should be followed
for fifth amendment claims also is open to
serious debate. Such an approach was used in
United States v. Mays,8 3 a pre-Lovasco case. The
Ninth Circuit rejected both the conjunctive and
disjunctive two prong test and used an ap-
proach that balances three different factors in
reaching its determination. With the exception
of the defendant's assertion of his right to a
speedy trial, the factors are identical to those
espoused in Barker.84 In Mays, the defendant
was indicted four and one half years after the
offense of misappropriated bank funds. The
court, in reversing the trial court's dismissal of
the indictment, found that the accused failed
to adequately prove prejudice by merely stating
that potential witnesses became unavailable.
Although it is not clear whether the court in
Mays actually reached its decision by balancing
the factors it listed, it nevertheless represents
an alternative fifth amendment approach to
the Marion, Lovasco formulation. Part of the
problem in determining how the court in Mays
reached its decision stems from the notion that
the two prong test may actually encompass a
balancing test similar to the one espoused in
Barker. As already noted,8 6 for the accused to
prove prejudice, it is a very onerous task.
Courts, though not expressly admitting that
they have weighed various factors in their de-
82 404 U.S. at 533 (1972).
1 549 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1977). See note 17,supra.
1 549 F.2d at 677. With respect to the right to a
speedy trial, during the pre-arrest, pre-indictment
stage it is apparent that the defendant's assertion of
his right to a speedy trial is irrelevant. The accused
at this time may not even know he is the focus of an
investigation and even if he is aware of such proceed-
ings, an indictment or arrest warrant may never be
issued. Thus, at this point in time, any assertion of
the right to a speedy trial will be too premature and
speculative to have any meaning.
8 In a strong dissent to the opinion, Judge Ely
stated that prejudice based upon missing witnesses
relates to the materiality of their connection to the
offense charged but "the burden of summoning
affadavits from buried bodies or dimmed minds will
be insurmountable." Id. at 682 (Ely, J., dissenting).
86 See text accompanying notes 44-63.
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termination of prejudice, are sometimes in-
clined to look at the length of the delay and
the reasons for the delay in their overall assess-
ment.
8 7
Another aspect of Lovasco which the Court
has failed to deal with adequately concerns
Rule 48(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure,88 which allows for dismissal of an
indictment if there is unnecessary delay sur-
rounding the proceedings. In United States v.
Marion, the Court held that Rule 48(b) is
"clearly limited to post-arrest situations."8' 9
While not addressing directly the issue of when
the rule attaches, a district court in United States
v. Navarre90 shed some light on the test for
applying the rule by distinguishing between a
motion to dismiss based upon a constitutional
right and one grounded upon a rule:
Dismissal based upon a constitutional right re-
quires stricter proof than dismissal based on
nonconstitutional grounds under a Rule. In
order for the Court to dismiss for failure to
grant a speedy trial under the Sixth Amend-
ment, defendant must prove the following: (1)
length of delay: (2) reason for delay: (3) preju-
dice to defendant; and (4) no waiver by defend-
ant ... For dismissal on a non-constitutional
ground under Rule 48(b), the only factor which
the defendant must prove is that the delay was
unnecessary.9 1
Focusing on this difference of the standard
of proof between a rule and a constitutional
guarantee, it is apparent that some determina-
tion is necessary in order to establish guidelines
regarding when the courts should apply either
in relation to a speedy trial claim. If the Court
in Marion is correct that Rule 48(b) does not
become applicable until a post-arrest situation,
then clearly the sixth amendment speedy trial
provision would also be applicable to the post-
arrest period, and the courts will face the
8 See note 50supra.
a See note 9 supra.
, 404 U.S. at 319. See also Nickens v. United States,
323 F.2d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1963), Harlow v. United
States, 301 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1962), United States v.
DeTienne 468 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 911 (1973).
90 310 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. La. 1969). In Navarre,
the defendant was arrested on November 2, 1967
and indicted on January 1, 1969 for an offense
alleged to have occurred October 31, 1967.
91 Id. at 522. See also United States v. McKee, 332
F. Supp. 823 (D. Wyo. 1971).
dilemma of deciding via which route to judge a
speedy trial claim.
To rectify this potential area of confusion,
two explanations are possible as to why both
Rule 48(b) and the sixth amendment speedy
trial provision are concurrently applicable with
different standards of proof. First of all, it is
possible that the Navarre court is in error when
it distinguished between a rule and a constitu-
tional amendment.9 2 This however, is highly
unlikely in view of the history of the rule.
According to Moore's Federal Practice:
Rule 48(b) is a codification of the inherent power
of a court to dismiss a case for want of prosecu-
tion. The Rule also implements the right of an
accused to a speedy trial under the sixth amend-
ment. But it is not entirely coextensive with that
right. While most dismissals for delay in prose-
cution are grounded on the constitutional pro-
vision, Rule 48(b) serves a somewhat broader
purpose and these are instances of dismissal
involving no denial of constitutional rights.3
The second explanation, and the more plau-
sible one, questions the validity of the Marion
Court's determination that Rule 48(b) attaches
only in a post-arrest situation. Perhaps prior to
arrest and indictment, and before the sixth
amendment right to a speedy trial attaches,
Rule 48(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure should govern the determination of
a speedy trial violation rather than the fifth
amendment due process clause. Under Rule
48(b), with its less stringent burden of proof
requirements, a potential defendant would
have a more realistic opportunity to validate a
speedy trial claim than under the stricter due
process grounds. It must be remembered, that
under Lovasco's two prong test, the requisite
amount of proof necessary to establish a due
process claim is extremely high. This difficulty
is increased when one considers that a future
defendant may not even be aware of the initial
delay in the proceedings against him, and as a
consequence, fails to keep an account or record
of material events or witnesses which may even-
tually prove the prejudicial effect of the delay.
92But see United States v. Ward, 240 F. Supp. 659
(W. D. Wis. 1965) ("Rule 48(b) is merely a contempo-
rary enunciation of the Constitutional right to a
speedy trial.") (quoting United States v. Palermo, 27
F.R.D. 393 (1961)).
93 8B MooRE's FED PRACTICE § 48.03.
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In order to eliminate some of the confusion
in the courts regarding the application of the
fifth amendment, perhaps what is required is
an extension of the Speedy Trials Act of 19749
to the pre-arrest and pre-indictment stage. The
Act, which at present only pertains to the post-
arrest or post-indictment stage of a prosecu-
tion, sets forth various time limits in which an
accused must be brought to trial. By extending
the Act to include the pre-indictment, pre-ar-
rest stage, the legislature would be enacting
the much needed guidelines for the courts to
follow in making a determination of just how
much delay is tolerable in the investigative
period. Furthermore, the guidelines would be
a more realistic determination than the statute
of limitations which some courts had adhered
to as their guide before Marion.
9 5
In formulating such guidelines, under the
Speedy Trials Act, a balance must be struck
between societal interests, which the Court has
intently focused upon, and individual rights,
which it has appeared to ignore. This is, of
course, much easier said than done. One sug-
gestion may be that the burden of proof re-
quired should be determined as inversely re-
lated to the length of time of the delay, due to
the increasing presumption of prejudice as time
elapses. Thus, for example, during the first six
months of an investigation, the strict due proc-
ess conjunctive test could be applied, but after
the six months, a more lenient test, such as
Rule 48(b), would be applicable. If the legisla-
ture would enact such legislation for each of
the various crime categories, e.g. felony or
misdeameanor, then the courts would at least
be able to establish some uniformity in their
determinations.
In his dissent in United States v. Lovasco, 9'
Mr. Justice Stevens indicated that the majority's
opinion concerning the pre-arrest, preindict-
ment period, as applied to the constitutional
right to a speedy trial, would have the effect of
undermining the Speedy Trials Act of 1974.
While Congress never intended that the Act
should apply to the pre-indictment, pre-arrest
94 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1975 amend.). The Act sets
forth various time limits between arrest, indictment
and trial.
91 See notes 58 & 59supra and accompanying text.
9 97 S. Ct. at 2054 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
stage of an investigation, 97 Stevens' point is
well founded. Once a prosecutor files an indict-
ment or has an individual arrested, under the
Speedy Trials Act, that individual must be
brought to trial within a certain period of time.
With this in mind, a prosecutor may deliber-
ately delay indictment or arrest in order to toll
the time limit imposed via the Speedy Trials
Act. The only recourse, available to an individ-
ual in this situation, would then be the stringent
two prong test required under Lovasco. Hence,
the Speedy Trials Act has and will create9"
increasing pressure for the courts to deal with
pre-indictment and pre-arrest delay. Without
the appropriate guidelines available, the courts
will continue to face enormous discontinuity
and confusion in attempting to interpret and
apply the relevant law.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in
United States v. Lovasco to consider the various
circumstances in a pre-arrest, pre-indictment
situation that would require dismissal of an
indictment due to delay.9 The Court pur-
ported to clear up some of the confusion con-
cerning the due process standards evolved in
Marion by making it clear that a two part
conjunctive test is required under the fifth
amendment. The Court, however, has side-
stepped the issues of what each of these prongs
of the test entails and to whom, and to what
extent, the burdens of proof falls. The Court
has also, by not explicitly reviewing each aspect
of the test, left some doubt as to the future of
Marion's standards of prejudice and the inten-
tional tactics engaged in by the government.
With the implementation of the Speedy
Trials Act of 1974, additional pressure will be
brought upon the courts to make determina-
tions regarding prolonged delay during the
investigative period. Without appropriate
guidelines to aid in this determination, the
outlook for uniformity and consistency within
the courts appears bleak. For now, the courts
must attempt to interpret the two part conjunc-
tive test of Lovasco, requiring a showing of
prejudice to the accused and a consideration of
the reasons for the delay.
97 120 CONG. REc. 41618 (1974).
98 18 U.S.C. §§ 3163, 3164.
9 97 S. Ct. at 2046.
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